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Highlights
• “Theory of Mind” plays an important role in children’s social development, and it 
should be taught in school.
• Educators should be aware of the practical issues in teaching Theory of Mind in school.
• Practical issues include limited generalisability of the learning effect, a possible 
iatrogenic effect, as well as the sociocultural and pedagogical differences across 
societies in children’s Theory of Mind development. 
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“Theory of Mind” (ToM) refers to an individual’s ability to understand and attribute one’s 
and other people’s mental states, such as thoughts, intentions and beliefs (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). ToM is part of the construct of social cognition, 
and empirical evidence has suggested ToM plays an important role in children’s social 
development. The significance of ToM in children’s development has led researchers to 
examine individual differences in ToM and their implications (Hughes, 2011). Additionally, 
researchers have considered  whether children who lagged behind in ToM can catch up 
with their peers, leading to the question as to whether ToM can be taught in school. From 
a socio-constructivism perspective, it may be useful to teach ToM in school as teachers can 
provide scaffolding to children, hence reducing gaps in ToM development. This review 
will explore whether ToM could be and should be taught in school. The review argues that, 
given its social origin, ToM can be taught in school, and it should be incorporated in the 
curriculum instead of being taught as an independent subject. However, ToM should be 
taught in school only if educators are aware of the practical issues in doing so: there might 
be a limited generalisability of the learning effect, a possible iatrogenic effect, as well as the 
sociocultural and pedagogical differences across societies in children’s ToM development. 
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Introduction
“Theory of Mind” (ToM) can be defined as an individual’s ability to understand and attribute one’s and other people’s mental states, such as 
thoughts, intentions and beliefs (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Research has found 
that ToM not only facilitates peer relationships (Banerjee 
et al., 2011), emotional understanding (Bender et al., 
2011), 2011), and sensitivity to criticism (Cutting & 
Dunn, 2002), but also fosters children’s development 
and learning in the modern classroom setting where 
there is an increasing focus on peer-assisted learning 
(Fuchs et al., 1997) and dialogic pedagogy (Edwards-
Groves & Davidson, 2017). There has been an ongoing 
history of research on ToM training studies, focusing on 
how ToM can be improved in experimental settings (e.g. 
Begeer et al., 2011, 2015). Nonetheless, how ToM can 
be improved in educational settings is still an under-
researched area (Smogorzewska et al., 2020). As such, 
it is essential to consider whether ToM can be taught in 
school. 
Given the insufficient research on teaching ToM in 
an educational setting, the aim of this article is to 
provide a comprehensive review of the possibilities 
and practicalities of teaching ToM in school. This 
review will explore whether ToM could be and should 
be taught in school. The review argues that, given 
its social origin, ToM can be taught in school, and it 
should be incorporated in the curriculum instead of 
being introduced as an independent subject. However, 
ToM should be taught in school only if educators are 
aware of the practical issues in doing so. There might 
be a limited generalisability of the learning effect, a 
possible iatrogenic effect, and the sociocultural and 
pedagogical differences across societies in children’s 
ToM development. 
Theoretical overview of Theory of Mind
The construct 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) first proposed the 
concept of ToM in their study on chimpanzees. Since 
then, researchers have begun to study ToM in children. 
Three dominant theories in the literature attempt to 
explain the origin of ToM: theory-theory, modular 
theory and simulation theory. 
Theory-theory (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) argues that 
ToM is an implicit theory formed inside the mind and 
through interacting with the world. The child acts like 
a scientist by observing and collecting evidence that 
may change their perception of the world. Modular 
theory suggests an innate “theory of mind mechanism” 
(Leslie, 1994) which is domain-specific. In other 
words, ToM is a specialised skill. This mechanism is 
damaged in people with Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995; Leslie, 1994), 
resulting in a deficit in ToM development. In contrast, 
simulation theory (Harris, 1992) suggests that children 
form ToM through social experiences, such as imitating 
people’s behaviours. Studies on mirror neurons (Gallese 
& Goldman, 1998; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Tai et al., 
2004) have provided support to the simulation theory 
of ToM by demonstrating humans’ innate capacity for 
understanding the mental states of others. However, 
there are limited neuroimaging studies on children 
and insufficient longitudinal data to understand the 
relationship between the development of a mirror 
neuron system and ToM. These theories on the origins 
of ToM should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. 
Instead, they should be taken together to provide 
an integrative account in explaining children’s ToM 
development (Hughes, 2011).
Several tasks have been designed to measure the different 
domains of ToM: namely, false-belief understanding, 
which involves knowing that beliefs can differ from 
reality (Bauminger-Zviely, 2013); appearance-reality 
distinction, referring to the understanding that what an 
object appears to be, could be different to what it is in 
reality (Flavell et al., 1983); and emotion recognition 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). A brief description of 
some commonly used ToM tasks is provided in the 
Appendix. False-belief understanding is widely used 
as a measurement of ToM. Studies have suggested that 
typically developing children usually acquire false-belief 
understanding at the age of three to four (Wellman et 
al., 2001). Three standard false-belief tasks are the 
unexpected location task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), the 
unexpected content task (Perner et al., 1987), and the 
Sally-Anne test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). 
However, there have been controversies on whether 
false-belief understanding is a valid measurement of 
ToM. Some have argued that false-belief tasks demand 
something more than merely ToM. The tasks require 
children to exercise working memory and inhibitory 
control (e.g. Bloom & German, 2000; Leslie & Polizzi, 
1998). Moreover, with the recent proposal of ToM as a 
multidimensional construct, a standardised task has not 
yet been developed to assess such multidimensionality 
(Westby & Robinson, 2014). Therefore, studies need to 
use a range of ToM tasks to measure the developmental 
trajectory of ToM beyond false-belief understanding, 
especially after the age of five. Some examples are: 
second-order belief test (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), the 
TOM test (Muris et al., 1999), faux pas task (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999), strange story (Happé, 1994) and 
silent films (Devine & Hughes, 2013), director task 
(Dumontheil et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2000), and 
triangles task (Abell et al., 2000). 
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Developmental significance of Theory of 
Mind
Deficits in ToM have been observed in several 
atypically developing or clinical groups with delays in 
social development, such as those with ASD (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985; Yirmiya et al., 1998), schizophrenia 
(Benedetti et al., 2009; Brüne, 2005; Sprong et al., 
2007), and those who are deaf (Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 
2000). In addition to atypical developing groups, studies 
have established the significance of ToM in several 
areas of social competence in typically developing 
children. These areas include but are not limited to peer 
relationships and bullying, emotional understanding, 
and sensitivity to criticism.
Peer relationship and bullying 
Understanding people’s mental states allow children 
to connect with others and think in their shoes, 
hence developing friendships. Indeed, a relationship 
between ToM and peer popularity has been found in 
the literature. Dockett and Degotardi (1997) measured 
the sociometric status in a group of five-year-olds and 
reported a positive association between ToM skills 
and popularity. Prosocial behaviours were found to be 
a mediating factor in the link between ToM and peer 
relationship: children who had a more advanced ToM 
understanding and were able to generalise the skills 
in everyday situations (as demonstrated by prosocial 
behaviours such as co-operation) were more likely 
to be popular among peers (Caputi et al., 2012). The 
effect is likely to be longitudinal and persists beyond 
preschool, with ToM skills having a greater impact 
on peer relationships when the children become older 
(Banerjee et al., 2011). In contrast, children with poorer 
ToM skills were more vulnerable to being victims in 
adolescence (Shakoor et al., 2012). However, there 
is also a “dark side” to a stronger ToM, for it may be 
related to relational bullying, i.e. bullying others by 
damaging social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 
1995). In a study on a group of 7-10-year-olds, Sutton 
et al. (1999) found that bullies, especially relational 
bullies, demonstrated more advanced ToM skills and 
were stronger at manipulating social relationships using 
their ToM skills, hence more capable of demonstrating 
relational aggression. 
Emotional understanding 
ToM is also important for emotional understanding, 
particularly the understanding of belief-based emotions 
(Bender et al., 2011) and the attribution of moral 
emotions (Krettenauer et al., 2008). Although false-
belief understanding usually emerges between age 
three to five, the ability to understand belief-based 
emotions and attribute moral emotions develops at a 
later stage. Bender et al. (2011) tested a group of 5-7 
year-olds on false-belief and belief-based emotions 
and reported an age-related development in false-
belief understanding but not in belief-based emotional 
understanding. Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988) 
found that 4-5 year-olds can identify morally wrong 
actions. Still, they could not attribute the correct moral 
emotion to the morally wrong actions until the age of 
seven to eight (the response of a “happy-victimiser” 
described in Krettenauer et al., 2008). These results 
reflected four-year-olds’ inability in understanding 
belief-based emotions and attributing emotions despite 
acquiring a false-belief understanding. The discrepancy 
between the development of false-belief understanding 
and emotional understanding suggests that ToM may be 
a precursor for children’s emotional development. 
Sensitivity to criticism 
Cutting and Dunn (2002) found children with more 
advanced ToM skills were more sensitive to criticism. 
Children who were more sensitive to criticism at school 
were more likely to perceive themselves negatively, 
resulting in lower self-esteem (Cutting & Dunn, 2002; 
Dunn, 1995). The findings indicated the possible 
negative aspects of ToM, but more recent research 
has suggested that sensitivity to criticism may be a 
mediating factor for academic success (Lecce et al., 
2011). As Cutting and Dunn (2002) have suggested, 
children with higher sensitivity to criticism may be 
more likely to reflect based on the feedback given. 
On top of the established role of ToM in peer 
relationships, emotional understanding, and sensitivity 
to criticism, ToM also fosters children’s development 
and learning in the modern classroom setting where 
there is an increasing focus on peer-assisted learning 
(Fuchs et al., 1997) and dialogic pedagogy (Edwards-
Groves & Davidson, 2017). A well-developed ToM is 
necessary to enhance the benefits children can receive 
from these class practices. Therefore, it is essential 
to consider whether ToM can be taught in school to 
promote the development of ToM, which then lays 
the foundation for children’s subsequent social and 
cognitive development. 
From developmental changes to individual 
differences
The development of ToM in early childhood has 
been well-documented, so recent studies have drawn 
attention to ToM development in middle childhood and 
beyond (Smogorzewska et al., 2020). For example, age-
related improvement and continuity of ToM have been 
reported in the middle- and late-childhood (Devine & 
Hughes, 2013). The findings suggest that ToM does 
not stop developing nor reach its peak at age four, so 
there is a need to look at the developmental trajectory 
beyond early childhood and move beyond using only 
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false-belief understanding as a measurement of ToM. In 
addition, over the past three decades, there has been a 
paradigm shift in studies on ToM (Hughes, 2011). 
Given the paradigm shift, research has moved from 
focusing on the developmental changes of ToM at 
different stages to an increased emphasis on children’s 
individual differences and resilience in ToM (e.g. 
Biao et al., 2011). Therefore, a developmental 
perspective is needed to understand the continuities 
and changes of ToM and how the variability in ToM 
predicts social relations and social competence in later 
stages of life (Devine et al., 2016; Hughes & Leekam, 
2004). Moreover, it is important to look at individual 
differences in children to address whether ToM can be 
and should be taught in school. 
The social root of Theory of Mind
Research in comparative psychology has found that 
chimpanzees, a highly social species, possessed ToM in 
understanding goals and intentions but not false-belief 
understanding (Call & Tomasello, 2008). The findings 
have suggested that social experience may be the origin 
of ToM. Understanding the origin of ToM in humans is 
essential in determining whether ToM can be taught in 
school and, if it is possible, how. Despite the theoretical 
controversies on the origin of ToM, in the past three 
decades, empirical evidence has indicated a promising 
picture that ToM has a social origin. 
With advancements in research methodologies and 
neurobiology, researchers have begun to disentangle 
the gene-environment effects on ToM development. In 
a twin study (Hughes et al., 2005), genes were found 
to explain only 7% of the individual differences on 
ToM, suggesting a stronger influence of environmental 
factors, such as verbal ability (Milligan et al., 2007) 
and socioeconomic status of the family (Hoff, 2003), on 
the individual differences in ToM. Other twin studies 
(Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Ronald et al., 2005) also 
confirmed the importance of environmental factors 
on ToM development. Indeed, social experiences play 
an important role in children’s acquisition of ToM 
(Astington, 1998), and three lines of evidence have 
been found to support this claim. 
Firstly, studies have reported a relationship between 
conversational experience and ToM development. 
There is a positive relationship between the amount of 
mental state talk (e.g. “Why are you feeling sad about 
your spilt milk?”) in the family and the children’s 
subsequent understanding of false-belief and emotions. 
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla and Youngblade 
(1991) found that children who engaged in more mental 
state conversations with their mother and siblings at 33 
months showed a stronger understanding of false-belief 
and emotions at 40 months. In another study, Dunn, 
Brown, and Beardsall (1991) reported that children’s 
frequency of mental state talk with their mother and 
siblings at age three significantly predicted their ability 
to identify emotions at age six: children who engaged in 
more mental state conversation in the family performed 
stronger subsequently. The results demonstrated 
continuity in children’s individual differences on ToM 
and suggested an important role for conversation in 
ToM development. 
Secondly, family size is related to ToM development 
(Perner et al., 1994; Ruffman, 2014). Children with 
siblings scored higher on false-belief understanding 
tasks, and the relationship between family size and 
ToM understanding was greater in children with 
lower language ability (Jenkins & Astington, 1996). 
Children with a bigger family size may experience more 
discourse and interaction, which act as a scaffold for 
their mental state understanding. Jenkins et al. (2003) 
found that 4-year-olds with older siblings experienced 
more mental state talk than those without siblings. 
It is possible that children with siblings engaged 
in more mental state exchange when dealing with 
conflicts among siblings. The idea that siblings foster 
the children’s ToM development is consistent with a 
Vygotskian perspective that social interaction is vital in 
children’s learning (Vygotsky, 1987). Having a sibling 
also allows children to participate in more pretend play, 
enhancing ToM development given the representational 
nature of pretence (Leslie, 1987). 
Thirdly, mothers’ mind-mindedness was also reported 
to facilitate children’s ToM development. Mind-
mindedness refers to the parents’ awareness that children 
are individuals with minds, and so they are more likely 
to respond to the children’s actions and engage them 
with conversations about feelings, intentions, beliefs and 
emotions (Meins et al., 1998). In a study by Meins et al. 
(2002), mothers’ mind-mindedness when the children 
were six months old was linked to their performance 
on ToM tasks at age four, accounting for 11% of the 
variance in their task scores. The study demonstrated 
the influence of exposure to mental state talk during 
early age, providing strong evidence for the impact of 
social experience on ToM development. 
These findings suggested that social experience, 
especially in the early home environment, is important 
for developing ToM. However, it does not mean 
that children do not develop ToM beyond the home 
environment. When children start going to school, 
they begin to establish relationships with peers, and 
there is an association between peer relationships 
and ToM development (Hughes & Dunn, 1998), 
especially on the frequency of mental state talk among 
peers (Dunn & Cutting, 1999). Since early sibling 
relationships are predictive of children’s subsequent 
relationships with peers (Dunn et al., 1994), there may 
be an interplay between the home and school setting 
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in ToM development. Neither the family nor the school 
should be fully responsible for the children’s ToM 
development, for the development of ToM is likely to 
be mediated and moderated by multiple factors in the 
children’s social environment. For example, gender 
difference is a moderating factor of ToM, with different 
aspects of parenting linked to the ToM understanding 
in boys and girls, respectively (Hughes et al., 1999). 
For boys, parental discipline was found to have a more 
significant link with ToM, whereas, for girls, parental 
warmth and affect were more significantly related to 
ToM. The findings suggested that one cannot simply 
assume a universal relationship between parenting and 
ToM: individual differences should be considered when 
considering the social origin of ToM. Nonetheless, the 
results from studies that examined the social origin 
of ToM are consistent with simulation theory (Harris, 
1992), indicating the importance of social experience, 
in particular mental state talk, in ToM development. 
Studies on the link between social experience and ToM 
implies that ToM can be taught in school, and some 
specific teaching strategies will be discussed next. 
Strategies to teach Theory of Mind 
effectively in school
Despite the empirical evidence on the social origin of 
ToM, the correlational results do not imply causation. 
Intervention and training studies are necessary to 
determine the factors that result in improvements in 
ToM. In the past three decades, a body of literature has 
developed on ToM training for typically developing 
children and children with ASD. Although early studies 
on ToM training were unsuccessful in improving ToM 
(Taylor & Hort, 1990), recent research has indicated the 
positive impact of ToM training. This section will review 
studies on successful ToM training and propose four 
main strategies (pretence training, language training, 
thinking skills training and general ToM skills training) 
that could be applied in school for ToM teaching. A 
summary of the reviewed studies can be found in the 
Appendix for reference. 
Pretence training
In a pretence training study involving a group of 3-5-year-
olds, Allen and Kinsey (2013) reported improvements 
in the children’s performance on appearance-reality 
distinction and emotion recognition tasks, but not false-
belief understanding. To interpret the results, one must 
first consider the relationship between pretend play and 
ToM. The significant association between pretend play 
and ToM was first proposed by Leslie (1987), in which 
pretend play was suggested to be the children’s earliest 
demonstration of ToM. The article suggested there were 
similarities between the ways in which children engage in 
pretend play and develop their understanding of mental 
states, indicating that pretend play and ToM depend 
on a common mechanism of “metarepresentation” 
(Leslie, 1987, pp.421), which is the understanding 
of oneself’s and others’ representations, e.g. mental 
states (Goswami, 2008; Leslie, 1987). In pretend play, 
children need to substitute an object with another by 
“isolating” the representation of the object, in reality, to 
accommodate for the pretend representation (Goswami, 
2008). This process indicates the children’s growing 
ability to understand social cognition and is essential 
for children’s emerging capacity for false-belief 
understanding and appearance-reality distinction. 
Why, then, was there no improvement in false-belief 
understanding in Allen and Kinsey’s (2013) study? A 
possible explanation of the results is the use of two 
different false-belief tasks during the pre-and pro-
test sessions in the study (the Sally-Anne test and the 
unexpected content task, respectively). Although it may 
be justified that using different false-belief tasks can 
avoid any order and practice effects on the participants, 
it could be problematic to do so given the different 
levels of difficulty of the false-belief tasks. In the scale 
of difficulty proposed by Wellman and Liu (2004), the 
Sally-Anne test (a test of explicit false-belief) was ranked 
as more difficult than the unexpected content task (a 
test of content false-belief). Therefore, differences in the 
false-belief understanding before and after the training 
may be undermined. To avoid this problem, future 
studies that wish to use different false-belief tasks for 
pre and post-training could adopt a counterbalancing 
design or use an easier task first followed by a more 
difficult one. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the training activities 
in Allen and Kinsey’s (2013) study were conducted in 
the classroom, indicating the possibility of teaching ToM 
in a school setting. ToM teaching can be incorporated 
into the curriculum through pretence training, such as 
acting classes in elementary or high school (Goldstein 
& Winner, 2012). Through imitating and role-playing, 
children can exercise their metarepresentational ability 
and capacity for ToM. Moreover, the study supports 
previous correlational studies (Astington & Jenkins, 
1995; Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Lillard et al., 2013; Taylor 
& Carlson, 1997) that have reported a relationship 
between stronger ToM skills more frequent to pretend 
play. However, since correlation does not indicate 
causation, the association between pretend play and 
ToM remains unclear. It is likely that the language 
properties in pretend play, particularly mental state 
talk, are also important in facilitating and developing 
ToM. Hence, ToM teaching in school should not focus 
merely on pretence activities. 
Language training 
A large number of studies have reported a relationship 
between verbal ability and the development of ToM 
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(Milligan et al., 2007), so it is not surprising that 
many ToM training studies have used language as an 
independent variable to manipulate (e.g. Bianco et al., 
2019; Gao et al., 2020; Guajardo et al., 2013; Guajardo & 
Watson, 2002; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Slaughter 
& Gopnik, 1996). Common teaching strategies include 
providing feedback on the accuracy of the response, 
asking the children to reason their answers, explaining 
the answer, and engaging the children in a discussion. 
The rationale of these strategies is to emphasise 
children’s mental state talk that is representational in 
nature (Hofmann et al., 2016). 
Three aspects of mental state talk are believed to 
promote the development of ToM: pragmatic, semantic 
and syntactic (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Mori & Cigala, 
2016). The pragmatic use of languages, such as discourse 
and interaction, facilitates children’s engagement in 
exchanging beliefs and ideas with others, which then 
improves their of other people having different mental 
states (a conversational approach; e.g. Carpendale 
& Lewis, 2004). Research on children who are deaf 
has provided evidence of the important role of the 
pragmatic element of language in ToM development. 
Woolfe et al. (2002) reported that deaf children with 
deaf parents (who were likely to learn sign language 
from birth) showed a similar level of ToM performance 
with typically developing 4-year-olds. However, deaf 
children with hearing parents (who were more likely to 
be deprived of early social communication) performed 
as poorly as ASD children on the ToM task. The results 
reinforced the importance of language experience in 
ToM development. 
The semantic aspect of language, which is the use of a 
mental state lexicon like “think”, “believe”, and “know”, 
serves the role to bring the implicit mental state to 
children’s explicit awareness (Astington & Jenkins, 
1999). This is evident in studies showing that merely 
providing feedback on the accuracy of the answer 
was insufficient for children to improve their ToM 
skills (e.g. Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). Explanations 
on the reasoning and the answers were found to be 
more effective in ToM teaching. These psychological 
explanations, which seek to explain people’s behaviour 
based on their mental states (Wellman & Lagattuta, 
2004), are essential to ToM development.  In particular, 
it is demonstrated in the training studies that 
children who engaged in self-explanation rather than 
experimenter-produced explanation (Guajardo et al., 
2013) performed stronger on ToM tasks.
The syntactic aspect of language, which refers to the 
structure of the language, illustrates and provides a 
framework for children to understand mental states in 
sentences such as “A thinks B; C knows D; E believes F”. 
In particular, studies have investigated the relationship 
between syntax and ToM development (de Villiers & 
de Villiers, 2000; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Lohmann 
& Tomasello, 2003). By acknowledging the sentence 
structure in describing mental states, children can 
understand how people’s behaviours are related to their 
mental states and hence develop a ToM (de Villiers 
& Pyers, 2002). Moreover, as Astington and Jenkins 
(1999) have suggested, understanding the syntax of 
mental state sentences might be essential for children 
to describe false-belief understanding explicitly. Studies 
that have attempted to simplify the question in false-
belief tasks have reported improvement on the tasks by 
children who have previously failed (Lewis & Osborne, 
1990; Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Wimmer & Hard, 1991). 
The findings suggest a linguistic demand on the false-
belief tasks, which supports the role of understanding 
mental state syntax in the development of ToM.
Although there continue to be controversies in 
determining which of the three aspects are most 
important to ToM development (Mori & Cigala, 
2016), it is likely that teaching strategies focusing 
on a combination of these aspects would be most 
effective. This claim is demonstrated in Lohmann and 
Tomasello’s (2003) study, where children engaging in 
a discussion on deceptive objects, using mental state 
lexicon in sentence structure, showed the greatest 
improvement on ToM tasks. This research suggests 
that teachers could use some mental state verbs 
explicitly in their instruction and encourage children 
to generate explanations themselves. Moreover, Kidd 
and Castano (2013) reported an association between 
reading literary fiction and stronger ToM, implying 
that language can enhance ToM development in verbal 
and written form. Therefore, effective ToM teaching in 
school should incorporate both verbal and nonverbal 
language, such as feedback, explanation, discussion and 
reading. Teachers could engage in more mental state 
talk in everyday teaching and provide the children with 
explanations on the mental state verbs and sentences to 
foster their ToM development.
Thinking skills training
Several studies have adopted a “picture-in-the-head” 
training strategy, proposed by Swettenham et al. 
(1996), in training ToM (Fisher & Happé, 2005; Kloo 
& Perner, 2003; Paynter & Peterson, 2013; Wellman et 
al., 2002). Children were shown pictures in the dolls’ 
heads to demonstrate the presence of false-belief inside 
people’s minds, enhancing their comprehension of 
mental states and how other people’s false mental states 
may drive their behaviours. A variation of the strategy 
using thought bubbles is also effective in training ToM 
(Wellman et al., 2002). Thinking strategies were usually 
taught to atypical or clinical groups as compensation for 
their deficit in ToM (Swettenham, 1996; Wellman et al., 
2002), but understanding the possible reasons why such 
strategies are effective could provide insight into how 
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effective ToM teaching could be done by the school. 
Children’s thinking skills may be closely related to their 
executive functions and metacognition, and there is 
growing evidence of a relationship between executive 
functions and ToM (Carlson et al., 2002; Hughes, 1998; 
Perner & Lang, 1999). Teaching thinking skills may 
stimulate the development of ToM through improved 
executive functions skills. Furthermore, executive 
functions, in particular inhibitory control, may be needed 
to pass false-belief tasks. Not only do the children need 
to understand false-belief, but they are also required to 
inhibit the true belief in demonstrating an explicit false-
belief understanding in these tasks. In a microgenetic 
study, Flynn et al. (2004) found that inhibition followed 
a gradual development and emerged before false-belief 
understanding. The results suggested a role of executive 
functions in children’s passing of the false-belief tasks. 
Consistent with this result, Fisher & Happé (2005) found 
that children trained on executive functions showed 
improvements on ToM tasks in the follow-up sessions. 
In contrast, children trained on ToM showed immediate 
improvement on the tasks. The findings suggest there 
are “trickle-down effects” of executive functions. 
School-based interventions on executive functions (for 
a review, see Jacob & Parkinson, 2015) may promote 
ToM, but further research is needed to understand the 
exact mechanism and the nature of the relationship.
General Theory of Mind skills training
In contrast to typically developing children, a wider 
range of conversational skills targeted at training ToM 
may be taught to children with ASD with a delay in 
language development (Begeer et al., 2011, 2015; 
Chin & Bernard-Opitz, 2000; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). 
These skills can be viewed as part of a general ToM 
skills training aimed at compensating a deficiency in 
ToM. Several ToM intervention programmes have been 
specifically designed for children with ASD (e.g. Gevers 
et al., 2006; Steerneman et al., 1996). Some general 
techniques include social skills and conversational 
skills training, where children will be taught to initiate 
a conversation, maintain a topic, and take turns in 
conversation. 
The distinction in ToM teaching strategies in children 
with ASD and typically developing children has two 
implications for teachers: 1) the differences in the 
two groups’ ToM should be taken into account when 
considering how ToM can be taught in school because 
2) no universal teaching strategies should be applied 
to different groups. Teaching strategies should consider 
the students’ individual differences and be tailored to 
their respective needs. A general ToM skills training 
would be more suitable for children with ASD who 
show a deficit in ToM. 
In summary, training studies have indicated that ToM 
can be taught in school through pretence training, 
language training, thinking strategies and general ToM 
training – but should it be taught? 
Caveats when teaching Theory of Mind in 
school
Practical issues regarding teaching ToM in school should 
be considered before adopting any teaching strategies. 
To begin with, it should be noted that many of the 
training studies were carried out in an experimental 
setting instead of a naturalistic school setting. Drawing 
inferences from studies on the effectiveness of the 
Social and Emotional aspect of learning (Bond et al., 
2016; Lendrum et al., 2009), there may be a possible 
researcher-teacher gap in the implementation and 
effectiveness of ToM teaching. Teachers may not have 
sufficient knowledge of how the teaching strategies 
mentioned above can foster ToM development so that 
the teaching effect may be smaller than that carried out 
by a researcher. Despite numerous studies demonstrating 
that ToM teaching is possible, it is unclear whether 
children acquire ToM after training. 
Training studies with children with ASD reported the 
children’s inability to transfer their learning to other 
novel ToM tasks or other aspects of ToM (Hadwin et al., 
1996; McGregor et al., 1998; Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). 
This leads to the suggestion that children may have 
demonstrated rote learning and acquired the rules to 
pass the ToM tests in the training sessions instead of 
developing ToM understanding (Swettenham, 1996). 
In contrast, Slaughter and Gopnik (1996) found that 
typically developing children could generalise the 
learning effects to other tasks, suggesting a genuine 
learning effect, at least in the typically developing 
sample. However, even typically developing children 
have difficulty translating the ToM skills learnt to 
everyday contexts (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2014). In 
view of this, ToM should be carefully incorporated into 
the school curriculum, both across different subjects 
and on a long-term basis, such that the skills could be 
easily translated to everyday social situations. 
There may also be a possibility of an iatrogenic effect 
in ToM teaching, where the training resulted in 
detrimental outcomes for children. Ding et al. (2015) 
reported a causal relationship between ToM teaching 
and deception. After ToM training, the experimental 
group improved their ToM skills, but they were also 
more likely to deceive others in a hide-and-seek task. 
ToM allows children to understand how different 
people may have false beliefs and manipulate this piece 
of information in deception. The negative outcome of 
ToM teaching is an under-researched area, so future 
studies are needed before rejecting the teaching of 
ToM in school, given a relationship between ToM and 
dishonesty.
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Furthermore, educators should be aware of the possible 
cultural differences in the development of ToM. An 
earlier study by Avis and Harris (1991) has presented 
evidence for the universality of ToM, but later studies 
have suggested a difference in the time scale of 
ToM development. In their meta-analysis, Liu et al. 
(2008) reported that children in the USA and Canada 
performed stronger on false-belief tasks than their peers 
from China and Hong Kong. Children from China were 
also found to develop an understanding of knowledge 
before beliefs, in contrast to the opposite pattern found 
in children from the USA and Australia (Wellman et 
al., 2006). A possible explanation for the findings is a 
sociocultural difference between these countries. For 
example, Wellman et al. (2006) attributed the findings 
to less emphasis on individual’s mental states in China, 
so mental state talk in such cultures is less likely to focus 
on other people’s feelings (Lu et al., 2008). More recent 
studies (Hughes et al., 2014; Lecce & Hughes, 2010; 
Wang et al., 2016) suggested that another factor - a 
difference in the pedagogical experience across societies 
- has a stronger influence on the individual differences 
of ToM. It is found that children from societies with a 
school entry age of six (e.g. Italy, Japan and Hong Kong) 
performed worse on ToM tasks compared to their British 
peers who normally start school at age five. A school 
setting provides a context for children to establish peer 
relationships (which is found to be related to ToM) and 
opportunities for children to reflect on other people’s 
mental states through various activities. The greater 
pedagogical influence on children’s ToM (compared 
to sociocultural difference) is reinforced by Wang et 
al.’s (2016) study on British and Hong Kong children. 
British children and Hong Kong children attending 
international schools did not differ in their ToM skills, 
and these two groups performed significantly stronger 
on the ToM task compared to the Hong Kong children 
attending local schools. It is suggested that differences 
in the pedagogical curriculum can account for the 
results, as international schools in Hong Kong have a 
curriculum more similar to the one in Britain (Wang et 
al., 2016). Hence, children are more likely to actively 
engage in understanding and attributing mental states. 
Taken together, cross-cultural studies have highlighted 
some sociocultural and pedagogical influences on ToM 
development, and these influences should be considered 
in ToM teaching across different societies.  
In summary, ToM can be taught in school, but it should 
be done with caution. Teachers and educators should 
be aware of the following when teaching ToM in 
school: 1) the limited generalisability of learning effect 
implies that ToM teaching is a compensation and not 
knowledge acquisition; 2) there may be the possibility 
of an iatrogenic effect in ToM teaching; 3) sociocultural 
and pedagogical factors should be taken into account 
when devising ToM teaching strategies across different 
cultures. 
Conclusion
To conclude, ToM plays a significant role in children’s 
social development, such as peer relationships and 
bullying, emotional understanding, and sensitivity 
to criticism. Recent studies have suggested that ToM 
should be viewed as a multidimensional construct that 
develops gradually, and research interests have shifted 
to focus on individual differences in ToM. Researchers 
are particularly interested in investigating whether 
children who lag behind in ToM development can catch 
up with their peers. This paradigm shift has raised new 
questions in the field, especially whether ToM can be 
taught in school.  
With empirical evidence on the relationship between 
ToM and social experiences (e.g. conversational 
experience, family size, and mother’s mind-mindedness), 
it seems clear that ToM has a social origin and, therefore, 
can be taught in school. A review of training studies 
has proposed four possible ToM teaching strategies in 
school: pretence training, language training, thinking 
skills training, and general ToM skills training. Instead 
of being taught as an independent subject, ToM should 
be incorporated into the curriculum using a combination 
of teaching strategies tailored for different groups of 
students. Furthermore, when teaching ToM, educators 
should be aware of the limited transfer of the learning 
effect, the possibility of an iatrogenic effect in teaching, 
and how sociocultural and pedagogical factors can 
influence the development of ToM. Further directions 
on teaching ToM are needed to inform the pedagogy, 
such as improving the generalisability of the learning 
effect and how ToM can be most effectively taught in 
school.
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Appendix 1 List of studies selected for the literature review: Language training 
Studies Sample Conditions ToM measures 





Conversation on language; conversation on 
physical aspects  
  






Self-generated explanation or explanation 
produced by the experimenter; Explanation 
without feedback or feedback without 
explanation 
  
Unexpected content task; 
Unexpected location task; 
Knowledge access task 







Stories and discussion; No training Unexpected location task; 
Unexpected content; Deception 









Discussion of deceptive objects using 
mental state talk and feedback; Discussion 
of deceptive objects without mental state 
talk; Mental state discussions without 
deceptive objects (sentential complement); 
Children only asked to pay attention to the 
deceptive objects 
  
Representational change task 
(Gopnik & Astington, 1988); 
Appearance-reality task; 








Report owns’ false belief and other people’s 
or report perceptions and desires; Number 
conservation 
  








Feedback; Number conservation Unexpected content task; 
Appearance-reality task; 
Subjective probability task 
(Moore et al., 1989); Sources 
task (O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991) 
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Appendix 2 List of studies selected for the literature review: Thinking skills training  








training strategy; EF 
training; No 
intervention 
Unexpected location task; Unexpected content task; 
False photograph task; Penny-hiding deception 
(Baron-Cohen, 1992); Seeing leads to knowing 
(Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994); 
Knowing/guessing (Kazak et al., 1997); “Reading 





TD; n = 
44, 3-4 
EF training; Highlight 











Used thought bubbles 
(picture-in-the-head 
strategy) to teach false 
beliefs; No intervention 
  
Sally-Anne test; Unexpected content task 
Wellman et 





Used thought bubbles 
(picture-in-the-head 
strategy) to teach false 
beliefs 
  
Sally-Anne test; Unexpected content task 
Wellman et 





Used thought bubbles 
(picture-in-the-head 
strategy) to teach false 
beliefs 
  
Sally-Anne test; unexpected content task; 
unexpected location task; seeing leads to knowing  
(Baron-Cohen & Goodhart, 1994) 
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Appendix 3 List of studies selected for the literature review: General ToM skills training 
Studies Sample Conditions ToM measures 




ASD; n = 40, 8-
13 
  
ToM training; Waitlist control group  ToM test 
Begeer et al. 
(2015)  
ASD; n = 97, 7-
12 





ASD; n = 3, 5-7 Training on initiating a conversation, 
taking turns, and listening in the 
conversation, maintaining, and 
changing a conversation topic 
  
Sally-Anne test; Unexpected 





ASD; n = 9, 13-
14 
Social skills training: conversational 
skills, first and second-order 
perspective taking; No intervention  
Unexpected content task; 
Second-order belief test; 
Strange story, Overcoat 
story (Bowler, 1992)  
 
ToM = Theory of Mind, ASD = autistic spectrum disorder; TD = typically developing, EF = executive 
functions 
 
 
